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Abstract—Public IPv4 addresses are a scarce resource. While
IPv6 adoption is lagging, Network Address Translation (NAT)
technologies have been deployed over the last years to alleviate
IPv4 exiguity and their high rental cost. In particular, Carrier-
Grade NAT (CGN) is a well known solution to mask a whole
ISP network behind a limited amount of public IP addresses,
significantly reducing expenses.
Despite its economical benefits, CGN can introduce connectiv-
ity issues which have sprouted a considerable effort in research,
development and standardization. However, to the best of our
knowledge, little effort has been dedicated to investigate the
impact that CGN deployment may have on users’ traffic. This
paper fills the gap. We leverage passive measurements from
an ISP network deploying CGN and, by means of the Jensen-
Shannon divergence, we contrast several performance metrics
considering customers being offered public or private addresses.
In particular, we gauge the impact of CGN presence on users’
web browsing experience.
Our results testify that CGN is a mature and stable technology
as, if properly deployed, it does not harm users’ web browsing
experience. Indeed, while our analysis lets emerge expected
stochastic differences of certain indexes (e.g., the difference in
the path hop count), the measurements related to the quality
of users’ browsing are otherwise unperturbed. Interestingly, we
also observe that CGN protects customers from unsolicited, often
malicious, traffic.
Keywords—IP networks; Computer network management; Net-
work address translation; Web services; Performance
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The long anticipated exhaustion of public IPv4 addresses
is finally here. Given their scarcity, IPv4 addresses have been
the subject of an ongrowing market. In 2014, such market
increased by 220% and 600% according to recent estimates of
APNIC and RIPE, respectively, while the cost of a single IP
address reached 10$/year.1 This clearly translates into non neg-
ligible economical investments for Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) and organizations running large IP networks. The most
natural solution would be adopting IPv6, but, unfortunately, its
deployment is still lagging.2
Network Address Translation (NAT) techniques have be-
come a viable, reasonably cheap, solution to alleviate public
IPv4 exhaustion. In a nutshell, a router implementing NAT
functionality remaps the IP address space of a network into
one (or more) public IP address by modifying the network
address information in the packet header. For instance, in
the typical access network scenario, the home router runs a
NAT to “mask” users’ private network behind a single public
1http://www.ipaddressnews.com/2014/04/07/343
2https://labs.ripe.net/Members/gih/counting-ipv6-in-the-dns
IP address. Hence, multiple user devices can connect to the
Internet at the cost of a single public IP for the ISP.
Carrier-Grade NAT (CGN) technologies further extend
this concept allowing to mask a whole ISP network using
NAT [11]. In this scenario, the home routers are assigned
private IP addresses to communicate within the ISP network,
while CGN deployed at the peering routers interconnect the
ISP network with the Internet. This approach allows the ISP to
transform its network in a large private network, significantly
reducing the total amount of public IP addresses to use, and
thus the costs for maintaining them.
Despite the economical benefits, NAT techniques are more
or less successful depending on their configurations [6], [8] and
compliance to standards [4], [5], [10], [12]. Moreover, devices
connected to the network through NAT cannot be accessed
from the Internet unless specific actions are taken, and can
be subject to delays due to NAT mapping operations. Hence,
some questions naturally emerge: (i) Can CGN significantly
impact users’ experience when accessing Internet services? (ii)
What are the benefits for residential users in having a public IP
address at their home routers to access the Internet? (iii) Apart
cost savings, what are the incentives for the ISP in assigning
users’ home routers private IP addresses?
While a significant effort has been put in standardizing
CGN [11], [12], to the best of our knowledge little work has
been dedicated to study the impact on the traffic exchanged
with the Internet [4]. To fill this gap, we take advantage of a
dataset of traffic traces collected in the operational network
of a real ISP providing its customers with ADSL home
routers, which are assigned either public or private IP addresses
depending on the kind of subscription. In this scenario, all
home routers with a private IP access the Internet through CGN
technology. We split the monitored customers in two groups
based on the type of IP address (private or public) of their
home routers, and we assess the impact of CGN on the traffic
they generate when browsing the web. Specifically, we use
several metrics to evaluate the impact of CGN on the quality
of the users’ browsing experience, and rely on the Jensen-
Shannon divergence to pinpoint differences between the two
populations of customers.
Our findings show that no sharp differences can be ob-
served between the two populations, testifying that CGN is
a mature and reliable technology. Secondly, only 2% of users
with public IP addresses run services which actually need to be
reached from outside the ISP. Third, we observe a positive side-
effect of accessing the Internet through CGN: home routers are
more protected against unsolicited connection attempts (e.g.,
netscans, portscans, etc.), and malicious activities (e.g., DDoS,
intrusion attempts, etc.).
II. RELATED WORK
In the last years, CGN has been deployed in several ISP
networks to limit the utilization of the IP address space [2].
Given its strategic importance, the research community and
standardization authorities have made a great effort in under-
standing the impact of these technologies on the QoS and
end-users experience. For instance, IETF RFCs standardize
NAT requirements, implementations and behaviors [4], [5],
[10], [12]. In particular [4] describes a case study conducted
in a controlled testbed where multiple CGN configurations
are tested to identify possible impact on DSL residential
customers. Unfortunately, results are only qualitative and lack
of generalization due to the artificial scenario.
In [9] authors collect aggregate traffic traces from a real
ISP network to study ports allocation and mapping retention in
CGN. The analysis shows that recommended timeout values in
[5], [10] might be too long, resulting in suboptimal retention
policies, especially for UDP traffic. Similarly to [9], we collect
and analyze traffic traces from a real ISP network, but ours is
the first work, to the best of our knowledge, to specifically
target the problem of quantifying the impact of CGN on web
browsing experience.
III. MONITORING SETUP AND DATASET
We rely on passive measurements obtained by instrument-
ing a passive monitoring probe in the operational network of an
European country-wide ISP. Fig. 1 (top) depicts the monitoring
scenario. Each customer device accesses the Internet via an
ADSL home router. The ISP assigns either a public or private
IP address to each home router according to the user’s contract.
Home routers with a public IP address (public home routers)
access the Internet directly, while the traffic of customers
behind home routers with a private address (private home
routers) reaches the Internet through a CGN device.
The CGN used by the monitored ISP is based on the
NAT444 standard [3], which relies on sessions to translate
the private IP address of a home router into a public one.
When the CGN receives the first packet from a private home
router, it starts a new session, temporarily mapping the private
address to the first available in a pool of public addresses. It
then converts the address of all subsequent packets according
to the mapping.3 After a given inactivity time of the private
home router, the session expires and the public address is put
back in the pool of free addresses.
In our monitoring setup, we install a passive probe at
one Point of Presence (PoP) of the ISP to monitor the traffic
generated by home routers having either a public or a private IP
address. The probe runs Tstat [1], a passive monitoring tool
that observes all packets flowing on the link connecting the
PoP to the ISP backbone network. Tstat rebuilds each TCP
flow, tracks it, and, when the connection is torn down, logs
more than 100 statistics in a simple text file. For instance,
Tstat logs the client4 and server IP addresses, the application
3The amount of public addresses available at the NAT is smaller than the
number of customers provided with a private IP. Consequently, the pool size
of public addresses must be carefully set to minimize allocation costs, while
guaranteeing satisfactory connectivity.
4We take care of obfuscating any privacy sensitive information in the
logs (e.g., customer IP addresses are anonymized using irreversible hashing
functions with the advantage of the Crypto-PAn library). Private IP addresses
are labeled as such by Tstat before anonymization.
Fig. 1. The monitoring scenario we consider in this study (upper part) and
an example of time line of a Web transaction.
(L7) protocol type, the amount of bytes and packets sent
and received, etc. Finally, Tstat implements DN-Hunter [7],
a plugin that annotates each TCP flow with the server Fully
Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) retrieved via DNS queries.
This is particularly useful for unveiling services running on
HTTP and HTTPS. Tstat separately logs TCP connections for
which the Three-Way Handshake is not completed (e.g., when
the sole SYN message is observed). In the remaining, we refer
to this log type as failed-TCP, and we focus on such traffic
to investigate on possibly unsolicited traffic reaching the ISP
customers (see Sec. VII).
For this study we leverage a dataset collected during the
month of October 2014. It consists of TCP and failed-TCP
logs carrying 1,757M and 648M records respectively, for a
total of more than 50 TB of network traffic. As we target
the performance assessment for web browsing, we specifically
focus on flows carrying either HTTP or HTTPS transactions.
Overall, we process more than 400M TCP flows containing
688M HTTP requests. We split each of our logs in two subsets
according to the IP address type of the customer’s home router.
We find more than 10,000 home routers active over the month,
out of which 60% (40%) are assigned a private (public) IP
address.5 Similarly, 238M (59%) TCP flows are generated by
private home routers, and 162M (41%) by public ones.
IV. METHODOLOGY
Among the many measurements provided by Tstat, we
consider for each TCP flow: (i) The Round-Trip-Time (RTT)
between client and server; (ii) the Time-To-Live (TTL) of
packets sent by the server; (iii) the amount of bytes sent and
received by the client; (iv) the application layer protocol (e.g.,
HTTP and HTTPS); and (v) the timestamps of packets that
are instrumental to obtain further indices.6 These metrics are
5The home router IP address can be considered as an identifier of the
household. It may hide several devices connected to the Internet.
6Notice that the probe measures the timestamps at a vantage point close to
the customers. Therefore, for some metric X we can only gauge its estimated
measure X̂ .
straightforward to monitor, and details can be found in [1]. We
also consider the FQDN, and we leverage it to split the traffic
according to the service generating it.
We combine basic metrics provided by Tstat to build
indices we use to compare the impact of the CGN on users’
traffic at network and transport level (Sec. IV-A and Sec. IV-B,
respectively). Plus, in Sec. IV-C we present some indices
defined on purpose to measure the potential impact of the CGN
on users’ browsing experience.
A. Network Metrics
1) Number of Hops – #Hops: The minimum number of
hops being traversed by packets transmitted from the server to
the client. Given the maximum server-to-client TTL in a flow
(TTL), we choose x as the exponent minimizing #Hops =
2x − TTL.7 The resulting ̂#Hops is the minimum number
of hops that packets in flow have traversed before reaching
their destination. In our scenario we expect packets received
by private home routers to traverse a higher number of hops
due to the presence of the CGN.
2) Round Trip Time – RTT : The average RTT Tstat mea-
sures in a flow (R̂TT ) on packets transmitted from the client to
the server (as depicted in the lower part of Fig. 1). We expect
packets transmitted by private home routers to experience a
higher latency because of the CGN packet processing.
B. TCP Metrics
1) Three-Way Handshake Time – TWHT : The amount
of time measured by Tstat ( ̂TWHT ) the client takes to
successfully establish a TCP connection using the standard
Three-Way Handshake (TWH). Referring to the lower part of
Fig. 1, let TˆSY N be the timestamp of the SYN packet sent
by the client to start the connection establishment procedure,
and let TˆEstablish be the timestamp of the packet carrying the
ACK message ending the TWH. We define the ̂TWHT aŝTWHT = TˆEstablish − TˆSY N
In our scenario we expect the ̂TWHT to be higher for private
home routers due to the time needed by the CGN to allocate
the resources for the new communication session.
For the sake of completeness, we also consider some
specific TCP metrics: (i) The number of SYN messages needed
to open a connection, SY N ; (ii) the number of out of sequence
segments, OoS; (iii) the number of duplicated segments Dup.
These are measurements that we expect to be altered in case of
connectivity issues introduced by the CGN. A large value of
SY N , for instance, indicates that the client experienced some
difficulties trying to establish the connection.
C. Performance Metrics
1) Time to first byte – TTFB: The amount of time that
elapses between the first segment containing the HTTP request
sent by the client to the first segment with payload sent by the
server. Again referring to Fig. 1, let TˆRequest be the timestamp
of the first segment the client sends carrying application data,
7Depending on the OS of the device generating the packets, the initial TTL
may be set to different values. Common choices are 32, 64, 128, 255.
and TˆResponse the timestamp of server first response with
payload. We define the TTFB aŝTTFB = TˆResponse − TˆRequest
In HTTP flows, it represents a measure of the time span
between the application request issued by the client and the
consequent response by the server.
2) Goodput – G: The average rate at which the server
delivers information to the client. Let TˆResponse and TˆLast (see
Fig. 1) be the timestamps of the first and the last data packet
sent by the server, and let D be the size of the application
payload carried by the flow. We define the server goodput as
Gˆ =
D
TˆLast − TˆResponse
It is similarly possible to evaluate the goodput in the upload
direction by considering the amount of bytes sent by the client
to the server and referring to the timestamps relative to the
client traffic. To avoid the bias of short-lived flows, we evaluate
the download goodput only on flows for which D ≥ 1 MB,
and the upload goodput for flows where D ≥ 500 kB.
For each of the above metrics, we build empirical distri-
butions, i.e., Probability Density Functions (PDFs), separating
the traffic involving private and public home routers. Hence, to
pinpoint the metrics affected by the CGN, we adopt a tool that
allows the comparison of the collected empirical distributions.
Our choice falls on the Jensen-Shannon divergence, a popular
statistical index based on the Kullback-Leibler divergence.
Among its relevant properties, the the Jensen-Shannon diver-
gence is bounded to finite values and symmetric.
D. Jensen-Shannon divergence
To compactly represent the difference between a PDF p and
a PDF q we use the Jensen-Shannon divergence [13], which
varies in the range [0, ln(2)], and is defined as
JSdiv =
∑
i
{
1
2
pi ln
(
pi
1
2pi +
1
2qi
)
+
1
2
qi ln
(
qi
1
2qi +
1
2pi
)}
The two variables pi and qi are the probabilities composing
the two distributions. To avoid statistical bias, which may lead
to wrong conclusions, we need to put ourselves in conditions
to properly evaluate the JSdiv , and to discriminate between
notable and negligible differences in the distributions. Aside
the requirement for statistically relevant population sizes, the
JSdiv may be affected by more sneaky sources of bias, for
instance, tied to heterogeneity in the population size, as well
as to the binning strategy to compute pi and qi. Intuitively,
the population size must to be large enough to prevent border
effects tied to the finitude of the dataset. The type of samples
included in the population should also be akin, and the tool
used to measure the statistics should be well calibrated to avoid
arising artifacts. In our case, the population samples consists
of TCP flows. As described in Sec. III, our dataset is large
enough to avoid biases due to border effects.
We focus on the selection of a threshold to discriminate
among notable and negligible differences. We remind that for
two completely disjoint statistics, the JSdiv saturates to ln(2).
To visually tie the JSdiv to some examples, we resort
to negative exponential distributions. We generate a reference
sample from distribution of parameter λ0=1. A second set
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Fig. 2. Jensen-Shannon divergence computed on negative exponential
distributions with mean rates λ1 versus reference mean λ = 1.
TABLE I. JENSEN-SHANNON DIVERGENCE FOR CONSIDERED
METRICS AND DIFFERENT INTERNET SERVICES.
All Flows www.google.com TOP-50 Google phobos.apple.com̂#Hops 0.223 0.666 0.682 0.689
R̂TT 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.007̂TWHT 0.002 0.010 0.011 0.016
#SY N <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
OoS <0.001 – – –
Dup 0.001 0.001 0.001 <0.001̂TTFB 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.006
of samples is instead shaped according to a distribution of
parameter λ1. Then, we compute JSdiv comparing the two
PDFs of parameter λ0 and λ1. We set a very large population
size (106) so that non null JSdiv scores are only minimally tied
to the population size. For our experiment we use λ1 ∈ [1, 8].
Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDFs) of the negative
exponential distributions are depicted in the top portion of
Fig. 2, whereas the bottom plot reports the JSdiv .
As shown, thresholds are set in such a way that clearly
visible changes in the distribution space also raise alerts in
the JSdiv space. Intuitively, when JSdiv ∈ [1/10, ln(2)], the
difference between the two CDFs is significant (red area).
When JSdiv ∈ [2/100, 1/10) the difference is noticeable
(green area), and negligible if JSdiv ∈ [0, 2/100) (white area).
We also generate finite sequences with other known dis-
tributions of which we evaluate JSdiv , and we observe that
scores are similar across them (we do not report results for
the lack of space). This means that JSdiv is robust against the
kind of distributions we analyze.
In the next sections we make use of the JSdiv to contrast
private home routers against public home routers over several
empirical metric distributions we obtain from our dataset.
V. IMPACT OF CGN ON USERS’ TRAFFIC
We start our analysis by gauging the impact of CGN
on the network and the transport level metrics described in
Sec. IV-A and Sec. IV-B, respectively. The goal is to check
if home routers with private IP addresses experience worse
performance than those with public addresses.
A. Impact of CGN on Network- and Transport-level metrics
For this analysis, we consider TCP flows in which the
client IP address belongs to the set of monitored customers
while the server IP address is external. Distinguishing between
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Fig. 3. CDF of the number of hops ( ̂#Hops) measured from the server to
the client for private and public home routers against different web services.
Clear differences are visible.
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Fig. 4. CDF of time needed to complete the Three-Way Handshake
( ̂TWHT ) for private and public home routers against different web services.
No significant difference is visible.
clients with private and public IP addresses, we compute
the distributions for each metric described in Sec. IV-A and
Sec. IV-B, and we evaluate the Jensen-Shannon divergence for
them. We report the results in Tab. I, repeating the experiment
selecting flows directed to (i) any remote server (“all flows”);
(ii) “www.google.com” servers (i.e., Google Search); (iii)
TOP-50 most popular Google servers in our dataset (“TOP-
50 Google”); and (iv) “phobos.apple.com” servers providing
iTunes Store contents.8 As shown, the JSdiv never overcomes
the alarm threshold discussed in Sec. IV-D for all metrics but̂#Hops, meaning that the CGN configuration of our scenario
does not induce any significant bias.
The only metric that consistently overcomes the threshold
across all the considered Internet services is the number of
hops ( ̂#Hops). To validate the above finding, we directly
compare the distributions of ̂#Hops for private and public
home routers in Fig. 3. For the ease of visualization, we
do not report the case of “TOP-50 Google” servers as we
observe similar results to the “www.google.com” case. A clear
offset between the ̂#Hops of private and public home routers
appears, showing that private ones have to traverse more
hops to reach the Internet. Such offset is independent on the
considered Internet service. We verified this outcome with the
ISP network administrators, who confirmed that the difference
is due to some extra routers that packets forged by private
home routers have to go through to reach the CGN. However,
such routers are well dimensioned and not congested, with
little to no implication on the performance, as testified by other
metrics considered in Tab. I.
8We focus on this selection of services as they appear to be popular on the
monitored network, and the amount of TCP flows for each of them satisfies
the requirements for a proper use of the JSdiv .
TABLE II. JENSEN-SHANNON DIVERGENCE FOR THROUGHPUT
DISTRIBUTIONS IN DOWNLOAD AND UPLOAD DIRECTIONS.
Service FQDN JS div
D
ow
nl
oa
d All * 0.001
Facebook Video fbcdn-video-*.akamaihd.net 0.004
Tumblr media.tumblr.com 0.021
Phobos phobos.apple.com 0.022
U
pl
oa
d
All * 0.004
Amazon S3 eu-irl-*.s3.amazonaws.com 0.007
Whatsapp mm*.whatsapp.net 0.033
Dropbox dl-*.dropbox.com 0.046
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(a) Download. Only flows carrying ≥ 1 MB are considered.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
CD
F
PUBall
PRIall
 
PUBWhatsapp
PRIWhatsapp
 
PUBAmazonS3
PRIAmazonS3
(b) Upload. Only flows carrying ≥ 500 kB are considered.
Fig. 5. Normalized goodput CDFs for flows carrying Web traffic.
We also report the distributions for the connection estab-
lishment time ̂TWHT . This is a typical metric one could ex-
pect to be affected by additional delay introduced by the CGN
when private home routers try to establish new connections.
Indeed, the CGN may require some time to initiate the session
and translate addresses. Fig. 4 shows that distributions for pri-
vate and public home routers with respect to the same Internet
services are in practice identical, showing no considerable shift
in the connection setup time. Such result is also confirmed by
Tab. I, which reports low values of JSdiv for this metric.
B. Impact of CGN on users’ web browsing quality
We complement the above findings by applying the JSdiv
on the indices presented in Sec. IV-C. As reported in Tab. I,
the JSdiv of the Time to First Byte, ̂TTFB, indicates that
this metric is not affected by the presence of the CGN, and
that users accessing the Internet from private or public home
routers face similar delays.
Next, we perform the same analysis for the goodput Gˆ. We
consider several popular services that exchange large amount
of data and for which Gˆ is thus relevant. In particular, we
consider flows downloading content from Facebook Video,
Tumblr and Phobos servers, and flows uploading user data
to Amazon S3, Whatsapp and Dropbox. We report the results
in Tab. II, and draw the CDFs in Fig. 5. Observe that the
JSdiv does not overcome the alarm threshold, meaning that the
CGN does not significantly harm the download/upload speed
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Fig. 6. Number of active servers in the PoP with per-hour granularity (red
curve), and cumulative number of active servers over one month (black curve).
of private home routers. Fig. 5(a) depicts the distribution of the
normalized download Gˆ for the services reported in Tab. II (we
omit Facebook Video to ease the visualization). Note that the
differences between each pair of curves is negligible. Fig. 5(b)
reports results for the normalized upload Gˆ. Also in this case
the curves referring to private and public home routers show
very similar trends.9
Interestingly, a relatively large amount of flows (13.98%)
in Fig. 5(b) show almost zero throughput. By double-checking,
we realize that those are long-lived flows with a duration
of 10 min (or more), and showing a number of uploaded
bytes that slightly exceeds the 500 kB threshold. For some
services, indeed, clients establish a single TCP connection
with the remote server and keep sending tiny portions of data
intermittently, de facto zeroing the upload throughput.
VI. ACTIVE SERVERS IN THE POP
The per-year cost to rent a public IP address (around 10$)
is a non-negligible expense when multiplied for the number of
subscribers. Thus, considering the results presented in Sec. V,
we can conclude that the ISP has no actual incentive to provide
users’ home routers with public IP addresses. However, one
may argue that some customers may be interested in having
a public IP address to host servers they want to maintain
accessible from outside the ISP network. In this scenario, the
only way to guarantee the server reachability is to assign a
public IP address to the customer’s home router. We thus
perform a further investigation to gauge the number of home
routers with public address behind which some kinds of servers
are running. To count the number of active servers in our
dataset we consider all public home routers that generate at
least one HTTP, HTTPS, IMAP, POP or SMTP connection on
a daily basis.
Fig. 6 shows the cumulative number of distinct active
servers we observe over one month’s time, together with the
per-hour number of active servers. This result is boggling:
among the approximately 4,000 public home routers we mon-
itor in the PoP, 60 of them are actually running services being
accessed from the Internet. This enforces our claim that the
users have no effective need to ask for home routers with
public IP addresses.
VII. UNSOLICITED TRAFFIC
In this last section, we quantify how many home routers
interfacing the Internet by means of public/private IP address
9We normalize the measured throughput to not show the actual bandwidth
provided by the monitored ISP.
TABLE III. PERCENTAGE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HOME ROUTERS
TARGETED BY UNSOLICITED TRAFFIC. TOP-20 DESTINATION PORTS ARE
SHOWN AND SORTED ACCORDING TO PUBLIC ADDRESSES POPULATION.
Port Description Private Public
0 Illegal –OS fingerprinting– 0.1 79.3
135 Multiple†, MS Remote Procedure Call? <0.1 79.3
143 ADM†? IMAP <0.1 79.3
1433 Multiple†?, MS SQL Server 0.1 79.3
2222 Multiple†, Rockwell CSP2 1.0 79.3
3306 Nemog†, W32.Spybot†, MySQL Server 0.1 79.3
3389 Windows Remote Desktop Protocol? 0.1 79.3
5900 Evivinc†, Virtual Network Computing <0.1 79.3
32764 Cisco Access Point?, Cisco Routers? <0.1 79.3
3128 Multiple†, Proxy servers <0.1 79.3
22 Multiple†, SSH 3.2 79.2
445 Multiple†?, MS Active Directory <0.1 79.2
995 POP3 over SSL <0.1 79.2
8080 Multiple†, HTTP Alternate <0.1 79.1
25 Multiple†, SMTP <0.1 79.0
443 Multiple†, HTTPS / SSL 0.1 78.9
80 Multiple†, HTTP 1.8 78.5
21 Multiple†, FTP 4.6 78.1
23 Multiple†, Telnet <0.1 77.9
139 Multiple†?, NetBIOS <0.1 56.6
†: Worm or Threat, ?: Known vulnerability.
are exposed to unsolicited incoming traffic. We perform an
analysis based on the destination port used, which assesses the
number of connection attempts we observe in our failed-TCP
logs. First, we compile a list of IP addresses corresponding to
potential attackers by counting the number of SYN messages
they generate. In particular, we label as attacker every IP
address that forges SYN messages directed to 50 (or more)
distinct home routers in our PoP. Second, we check the port
list, and we focus on those that are associated with known
services or worms/threats. Hence, for each destination port, we
compute: (i) The number of distinct attackers; (ii) the number
of home routers contacted; and (iii) the number of connection
attempts.
Tab. III reports, for the top-20 most contacted ports, the
percentages of private and public home routers inside the PoP
being targets of connection attempts. As clearly shown, the
number of potential victims in the public home router set is
close to 80% for the vast majority of the considered ports.
Conversely, these percentages are minimal for private home
routers (below 5% in the worst case), as private addresses can
be reached only if the counterpart is within the borders of
the ISP network. We observe similar results for the amount
of connection attempts and the number of distinct attackers.
Considering Port 22, for instance, the number of connection
attempts peaks at 2 Millions against public home routers, and
stops at only 6,500 against private home routers. Similarly,
10,000 attackers are found in the global Internet, while less
than 200 are detected inside the ISP. We thus can validate our
hypothesis: Public home routers are definitely more exposed
to attacks than private ones, and CGN represents a first line of
defense to limit unsolicited traffic. For instance, the CGN has
the potential of curbing the spread of those bots whose goal
is to exploit vulnerabilities at the home routers.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we leveraged passive measurements to gauge
the impact of CGN deployment on the web browsing experi-
ence of users. To this end, we considered a large dataset of
traffic traces that we split according to the type of IP address
assigned to users’ home routers, i.e., public or private. Then,
we compared the two obtained populations leveraging differ-
ent performance metrics. We relied on the Jensen-Shannon
divergence to quickly pinpoint those showing stochastically
significant difference.
Our results show that the CGN technology is stable and
mature. If properly engineered and configured, the CGN does
not harm users’ web browsing activity. Moreover, we showed
that the CGN presence brings some positive side effects,
e.g., it protects home routers from unsolicited and possibly
malicious traffic. We complemented such findings by analyzing
the subset of users accessing services running on home servers
from the Internet. We observed that only a marginal share of
them actually exploits such setup. Hence, we conclude that the
ISP may have no actual need to provide users with public IP
addresses, when not specifically required.
In our ongoing efforts, we are planning to expand the
list of metrics we considered in this paper. For instance, this
work mostly relies on per-flow metrics to build its conclusions.
It may be worth extending our focus to include per-session
metrics. Finally, we are interested in performing the same
analysis to gauge the impact of CGN on activities other than
web browsing such as, e.g., P2P.
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